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Title: Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI) in Afghanistan: Initial Assessment in Three Afghan Cities Using a Standardized Assessment Tool and Potential for Application of AGQI in Future Operations

Authors: Anthony E. Pusateri, PhD[1, 3], Dean P. Thompson[1], Mark W. Donlin[1], Carman Oldre[1], and William A. Kruft[2]

[1]United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; [2]United States Agency for International Development, Kabul, Afghanistan; [3]Contact for Further Information: anthony.pusateri@us.army.mil

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Abstract

Initial assessments of governance quality were systematically conducted by civil affairs teams in the important Afghan cities of Gardez, Jalalabad, and Kandahar in late 2003. A validated assessment tool, the Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI) was used for the assessments. Although the populace generally supported the National Government and new democratic processes, important deficiencies in governance quality were documented in the areas of corruption, human rights, police, transparency, and others. In Gardez, AGQI results were successfully incorporated into a governance mentoring program with the Provincial Governor. The AGQI process was extremely successful and offers a significant advance over other assessment methods employed by civil affairs units. Involved units agreed that the process was well worth the time required and that it offered a great advance in terms of understanding the population and its needs. Whether employed according to a national strategy or used in a targeted manner, data from AGQI have great potential for providing valuable information to aid decision making at the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and higher levels, for guiding governance mentoring programs, and for monitoring progress over time in a statistically valid manner. The AGQI is a tool that empowers civil affairs teams and their commanders to better understand the population and its needs. It also has non-military applications. It should be incorporated as an important component of a larger system of Measures of Effectiveness for operations in Afghanistan. Although the AGQI was specifically designed for use in Afghanistan, it will be useful for civil-military as well as non-military operations in other parts of the world, with slight modification. Follow-up assessments in Afghanistan are essential.

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Introduction

The Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) conducted civil military operations throughout the Afghanistan Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA) until being realigned as part of a higher level command reorganization in early 2004. CJCMOTF operations in Afghanistan were largely focused on efforts to enhance security, facilitate reconstruction, and promote good governance in the areas it operated. Additionally, it facilitated communications between the Afghan central government and provincial, district, and local leaders. These efforts helped legitimize the nascent Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan people and reduced causes of instability.

The primary instruments through which CJCMOTF operated were the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRT concept was developed in concert with the Afghan government and has its full support. The first PRT was established under United States (US) command in Gardez in December 2002 to serve the eastern United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) region. The number of PRTs continues to grow, and, while US forces operate the majority, today there are also Coalition and NATO PRTs, such as those in Bamian (New Zealand), Mazar-e-Sharif (United Kingdom), Konduz (Germany), and Herat (Italy). Eventually, it is possible that there will be a PRT in each province. Under the new command structure, the PRTs remain essential to strengthening the reach of the Afghan government, promoting governance development, and enhancing security.

As part of a process to develop a system of metrics to assess progress in achieving desired tactical and operational effects toward a defined civil-military operations (CMO) end state, a standardized assessment tool was developed to assess and monitor governance at the local and regional levels. The Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI) was developed to provide a standardized means to assess governance quality and the needs of the population. AGQI data are useful at the local level, by providing current information to aid in commanders' decision-making. When compiled regionally or nationally, the data are also useful to higher level decision-makers, by providing statistically valid data for monitoring progress. Initial experience using the AGQI demonstrated that the method was easily executable by troops on the ground and that the information provided was even more useful to local operators and unit commanders than expected. In addition to providing information specifically addressed by questions in the AGQI assessment form, the process of the interview has proven to provide a wealth of additional subjective and objective information that can be immediately useful to leaders. An unexpected benefit of the process is that it appears to enhance relations with the local population because they appreciate the fact that they are asked what they think about a broad range of topics that are important to them, their village, etc. Results also provided valuable information for use in advisory/mentoring relationships between PRT personnel and local and regional leaders. A complete description of the methods used to develop measures of effectiveness (MOE) for CMO in Afghanistan, including development of the AGQI is discussed in a separate report (Pusateri et al., 2004).

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Even as combat operations continued, a number of development programs were underway in Afghanistan. It was recognized by the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan and all other organizations involved that the path to long-lasting peace, security, and prosperity was through the establishment of a legitimate, effective, and democratic government. Initial efforts at assisting the developing Afghan Government were focused primarily in the capital city, Kabul. Expansion of governance promotion programs as well as programs to extend the influence of the National Government awaited improvements in the security situation, and increases in funding and staffing for the numerous of the organizations involved.

A serious concern shared by the CMO planners, government analysts, and members of the civilian aid community who participated in planning and developing aspects of this assessment process, was that corruption or "warlordism" would rapidly fill the vacuum created after the fall of the brutal Taliban regime. The concern was that initial efforts at providing governance development support would be hindered by the security situation as well as by manpower and financial constraints, and that the prospects for long term stability of the Afghan Government would be undermined by rampant corruption at the local and regional levels and/or by the development of powerful local "warlords" who could either support terrorist networks or develop extensive criminal networks based on the opium trade. At the time of the assessments reported here, the security situation and other factors severely limited the ability of the civilian aid community to reach many areas. The PRTs offered the only means to perform governance assessments in many areas, especially where the security situation was nonpermissive.

High-level government programs and assistance relationships based in Kabul are essential. However, it is also important to understand to what degree government is serving the citizens at the local and regional levels. No systematic assessments of governance quality at the local or regional levels had been conducted by the end of 2003. Therefore, we conducted this initial assessment of governance quality by systematically interviewing average citizens, low-level leaders, and business people using the AGQI in three important Afghan cities, Gardez, Jalalabad, and Kandahar.

Methods

General

In December, 2003, baseline assessments were performed of Gardez, Jalalabad, and the city of Kandahar. Operations were based out of the respective PRTs, with assessment operations at the Jalalabad PRT augmented by personnel from the Parwan PRT. These were tactical operations conducted within the context of overall CJCMOTF operations.

Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators (AGQI) Data Collection Sheet

The AGQI is an assessment of the quality of governance from the point of view of consumers of government. It takes the form of an interview and is primarily conducted at the level of average citizens, business people, and low-level government and traditional leaders. However, the AGQI may be used with any category of person. The design is consistent with accepted procedures for social science research of this type (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998) and with interview procedures used to assess components of governance in other developing countries (World Bank International, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c). The composition of the AGQI data collection sheet takes into account previously published indicators of governance quality (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998). The data produced can be defined primarily as quantitative in nature but the design includes information that would also allow some degree of qualitative interpretation (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998). The process for collecting the data (described later) adds a significant qualitative component (Bryman, 1984; Sechrist and Sidana, 1995; Hentschel, 1998). The combined qualitative and quantitative nature of the information gathered makes the information both immediately useable by the PRT commander (or other leader) and valuable when consolidated at higher levels. Additionally, the data are useful for multilateral decision makers. Although the AGQI was specifically designed for use in Afghanistan, it will be useful for CMO and civilian relief operations in other parts of the world, with slight modification.

The AGQI data collection sheet is a standardized form with some sections that are completed for all interviews and other sections that are completed only for leaders or business people (Appendix A). The data collection sheet is designed to maximize check-the-block format to minimize required writing on the part of the recorder. Most of the form is formatted for answers on a 0 to 5 scale, with 1 indicating strong disagreement, 5 indicating strong agreement, and 0 denoting a response of non-applicable or does not know. The data collection sheet is divided into eight parts: Part 1: Demographics (15-20 questions); Part 2: Attitudes (8 questions); Part 3: Security (7 questions); Part 4: Human Rights (2 questions); Part 5: Democracy (5 questions); Part 6: Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs (11 questions); Part 7: Leaders Only (8 questions); and Part 8: Business People Only (15). In total, 48 questions are completed for an average citizen, 61 questions are completed for a leader, and 63 questions are completed for a business person. Each interview requires approximately 30 to 40 minutes.

Personnel and Training

       Force protection was the utmost consideration and was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. Although everyone had responsibility for force protection, the interviewer team(s) were not included as part of the designated force protection elements to allow the interview teams to focus completely on their work during the interviews. Each interview/assessment team included an interviewer, a recorder, and an interpreter. When necessary, the interviewer served as the recorder but this was avoided whenever possible to optimize the interviewer's ability to focus on the interview. The interviewer ran the interview, as it was important for the process that neither the interpreter nor the recorder assumed the initiative in this regard. In practice, rank and gender of the interviewer and recorder were not issues. Well trained personnel in the rank of E-4 successfully performed the AGQI interviews, although noncommissioned officers and officers conducted most interviews.

       The skills required to perform the interviews are common to civil affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel, selected categories of civilian interagency personnel (e.g. USAID personnel), and civilian relief community personnel. A period of training and rehearsal was conducted for all personnel prior to performing AGQI (Pusateri et al., 2004). Rehearsals were conducted by each interview/assessment team to ensure that each team member (three members per team) had exactly the same understanding of the meaning of each statement on the AGQI data collection sheet. Pre-mission rehearsals and after action reviews that included force protection elements were also conducted.

Conducting the Interview

       Once local security was established at the locations where interviews were to be conducted, two basic methods were used to locate a person to interview. One was for the interpreter to go ahead and find someone who was willing to be interviewed. Then the full team approached or the potential interviewee was lead to the team. The other method was for the entire team to accompany the interpreter as he approached potential interviewees. Both of these methods had applications. Before starting the interview, a semi-private or private place was located in which to conduct the interview. Interviews were conducted with only a single interviewee or with a very small group of people with whom the interviewee was obviously comfortable. Efforts were made to ensure that the interviewee was in a position to be as candid as possible.

       Additional people were not allowed to join the interview once it was started. The interview team was cognizant of the potential that enemy or government informants might attempt to hear what was being said. An effective way to start each interview was for the interviewer to introduce him or herself and to explain that part of his or her job as a Coalition soldier was to help the Afghan Government better serve the people. The interviewer would tell the interviewee that to best help the government improve, it was important for the team to know what the people really needed and how the government was doing for them. The interviewee was assured that all answers would be anonymous. Each interview was conducted with a single interviewee. Even if more than one person

was present and participating in the conversation, answers were assigned to a single interviewee and recorded as such. Multiple interviews were not conducted simultaneously within the same small group. This was important because, as a minimum, this would have been distracting to the interviewees. More importantly, a likely problem with conducting simultaneous interviews would be that interviewees would influence each other's answers. During the course of the interview, the interviewer conducted the interview in the order that the topics appeared on the AGQI data collection sheet. The recorder tracked the interview looking for questions missed and the demeanor of the interviewee. After the interviewer was finished, the recorder reminded the interviewer of omitted questions and clarified responses as necessary. At the discretion of the Civil Affairs Team Leader, the members of the interview team (only) removed their helmets while actually conducting the interview to facilitate the discussion.

When completing the data collection sheet, an attempt was made to complete each question. However, if the interviewee did not seem to understand the question after a few attempts at rephrasing, that question was skipped. Interviewers were careful not to convey frustration or disappointment to the interviewee if it was necessary to skip a question. After the interview, the team expressed appreciation for the person's honest opinions and for taking the time to participate.

Assessment locations were never made known to the population in advance and attempts were made to limit total time at any given location to an hour or less.

Planning

Prior to conducting assessments at each of the cities, a sampling plan was developed. This was important because the objective was to get the most representative sample as possible given the constraints of ongoing PRT missions, etc. Each city was divided geographically into three sectors. "No-go" areas, if any, were identified based on available intelligence. Based on the sampling strategy developed (Pusateri et al., 2004), the planned sample for this initial assessment in each city was the following: Average Citizen-9 per city; Leader-9 per city; Business person-9 per city. Each of these sampling targets was distributed across the three sectors identified in each city. Therefore, the goal was to interview 3 average citizens, 3 low-level leaders, and 3 business people within each sector of each city. This sampling approach would not be required for targeted applications of the AGQI but was important to allow the best opportunity for statistical analysis of this initial assessment. The statistical basis for this sampling approach is detailed in a previous report (Pusateri et al., 2004).

Data Handling and Conversion

Each data collection sheet was reviewed by the involved civil affairs team leader as soon as possible after data collection (usually within 24 hours) to ensure completeness and clarity of answers. Information gathered was used at the PRT and the data collection sheets were forwarded to the CJCMOTF staff for consolidation. Data were entered into Excel spreadsheets and the dataset was reviewed for accuracy of data entry. Data were then processed and analyzed as described below.

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Most AGQI responses were recorded on a modified Likert scale using possible scores of 0–5 representing the degree of agreement or support for the statement or item listed in the AGQI data collection sheet. A score of 1 corresponded to "strong disagreement/opposition" with the statement and a score of 5 corresponded to "strong agreement/support." Scores of 0 corresponded to "I do not know" or "Nonapplicable." For most questions/statements, a score of 0 was treated as no answer (missing value). In some instances, the answer "I do not know" was in itself a bad outcome (e.g. when asking if the person believes he would be treated fairly by the police if arrested). In cases where "I do not know" represented a bad outcome, a score of 2 (disagreement/opposition) was assigned. As a result, the scale was 1-5 for the purposes of most data analyses. Although the 1-5 scale described was not a true continuous scale, the numeric value of each response was positively related to the level of agreement with the statement. For statements and questions phrased in the negative and statements for which "agree" represents a bad outcome, scores were converted. This process yielded converted response scores such that 4 was always better than 3, 3 was better than 2, and so on. Converted response scores were used for all further analyses.

It was also important to examine the data on the basis of categorizations such as "Not Favorable" and "Favorable." In categorizing responses, the following procedure was used. Converted response scores of 1 (Strongly negative), 2 (Negative), and 3 (Neutral) were categorized as "Not Favorable". Scores of 4 (Positive) and 5 (Strongly positive) were categorized as "Favorable." The category "Missing" includes cases where there was no response recorded and cases where the score of 0 was considered a missing value.

Composites of multiple related variables were formed by a process of combining related converted response scores to assess selected components of governance. Composite variables were derived by combining and averaging converted response scores from related questions as follows. The composite variable "Business" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 64-76. The composite variable "Corruption" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 46, 49, 57, 58, 68, and 69. The composite variable "Democracy" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 38-42 and 47. The composite variable "Human Rights" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 36 and 37. The composite variable "Meeting Needs of the People" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 29, 33, 43, and 44. The composite variable "Police" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 24, 34, 34.1, 48, and 76. The composite variable "Transparency" was derived by combining converted response scores for numbers 45 and 64. Composite scores retain the nature of the converted response scores, so that higher scores are better than lower scores. Composite scores are not limited to the 1-5 discrete scale but assume a continuous nature with possible values ranging from 1.0 through 5.0. Therefore, the data analysis approach treated these data as continuous.

Designation of Governance Quality Ranges for Composite Scores

        The possible range of composite governance indicator scores, 1.0 to 5.0, was divided into three ranges, Severely Deficient Governance (mean composite indicator scores from 1.0 through 2.9), Moderately Deficient Governance (mean composite indicator scores from 3.0 through 3.9), and Acceptable Governance (mean composite indicator scores 4.0 through 5.0). This division was made so as to be consistent with the scoring criteria, where scores below 3.0 are negative/unfavorable, a score of 3.0 is neutral, and scores above 3.0 are positive/favorable. A mean composite governance indicator score of 3.0 indicates that on average, the population answers neither favorably nor unfavorably about the status of a given governance component. A score of 3.0 was designated as moderately deficient governance as opposed to acceptable governance because, although 3.0 constitutes a "neutral" average, the average is not really neutral when applied to governance competency. To attain a 3.0 mean, a sizeable portion of the population must respond unfavorably to questions pertaining to a given governance component. Further, when a person answers "neutrally" (3.0) when asked whether or not he could report human rights abuses without fear of reprisal, the meaning is that he is not sure that he could do so. Such a response is not indicative of acceptable governance. The score 4.0 was selected as the lower limit of the Acceptable Governance range. A mean composite governance indicator score of 4.0 indicates that on average, the population answers favorably about the status of a given governance component.

Statistical Analysis

        Data were combined for the three cities. Responses to individual questions/statements were characterized in two ways. Mean converted response scores were calculated using the MEANS procedure of SAS (SAS Institute Incorporated, 2001). Responses to each question/statement were also expressed categorically, in the categories Not Favorable, Favorable, or Missing, and frequencies reported. Composite governance indicators were analyzed by analysis of variance using the GLM procedure of SAS. Mean scores for each city were determined and compared among cities. Determination of whether a given score for a city fell statistically below the Acceptable or Moderately Deficient Governance Ranges was made by subtracting the cutoff score (4.0 or 3.0, respectively) from each composite variable score and determining whether the mean difference for the composite variable was statistically lower than 0. For all comparisons, statistical significance was defined as $p < .05$.

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Results

Sample size was approximately as planned in each city (Table 1). In Kandahar, it was not possible to obtain all of the required interviews within the scheduled period because an unrelated incident involving small arms fire near the PRT caused the PRT commander to recall the assessment teams for security reasons. In both Gardez and Jalalabad, more than the planned numbers of interviews were performed because the assessments were proceeding so well that the PRT commanders decided to have the teams continue beyond the target number.

Table 1. Number of Interviews by Category for Gardez, Jalalabad, and Kandahar

City	Citizen	Leader	Business Person	Total
Gardez	13	8	9	30
Jalalabad	10	10	14	34
Kandahar	7	8	10	25
Total	30	26	33	

In the Tables 2 through 8, combined results for the three cities studied are depicted. The percent and raw number of responses in each of the categories Missing, Not Favorable, and Favorable are shown. Where the favorable response is not obvious, the response considered favorable is parenthetically shown following the statement/question. Mean converted response scores are presented in the last column. Results for responses that were not scored according to the 1-5 scale described above are listed as scored in Table 9. Tables 10 through 12 depict the rankings of needs as reported by respondents (interviewees) in Gardez, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Results for questions 1 through 20 on the AGQI, which address demographic and administrative information, are not included in this report.

Composite governance indicator scores are depicted for each city in Figures 1 through 7. For the Business composite indicator category the score for Gardez was not statistically below the acceptable governance level, while both Jalalabad and Kandahar were in the moderately deficient governance range. There were no statistically significant differences among the cities in this composite indicator (Figure 1). For the Corruption composite indicator, all three cities scored in the severely deficient governance range, with Kandahar scoring significantly lower than either Jalalabad or Gardez (Figure 2). In the Democracy category, Gardez was not statistically below the acceptable governance range. Jalalabad and Kandahar were in the moderately deficient governance range and each scored statistically lower than Gardez (Figure 3). In the Human Rights category, Gardez scored in the severely deficient range while Jalalabad and Kandahar were moderately deficient (Figure 4). In Meeting Needs of the People, all three cities ranked in the moderately deficient governance range, with Kandahar and Jalalabad scoring statistically lower than Gardez (Figure 5). For Police, Gardez was moderately deficient while both Jalalabad and Kandahar scored statistically lower than Gardez and fell within the severely deficient governance range (Figure 6). Jalalabad and Kandahar were in the moderately deficient governance range for Transparency, while Gardez was statistically borderline (p=.08) between the moderately deficient and acceptable governance ranges (Figure 7).

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Table 2. Attitudes

Statement (a positive attitude about a given group defined as favorable)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
21. ITGA (Central Government)	1 (1)	14 (13)	85 (77)	4.1 ± 0.1
22. ANA	2 (2)	11 (10)	87 (79)	4.3 ± 0.1
23. Local Government	3 (3)	32 (29)	65 (59)	3.6 ± 0.1
24. Local Police	0 (0)	48 (44)	52 (47)	3.1 ± 0.2
25. Presence of Coalition Troops	0 (0)	2 (2)	98 (89)	4.5 ± 0.1
26. Relief Community	7 (6)	43 (39)	51 (46)	3.3 ± 0.1
27. Other ethnic groups in area	7 (6)	12 (11)	81 (74)	4.2 ± 0.1

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Table 3. Security

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
29. ITGA is currently involved in security efforts in area	4 (4)	30 (27)	66 (60)	3.7 ± 0.1
30. The security situation is good; there are no security concerns	0 (0)	27 (25)	72 (66)	3.6 ± 0.1
31. The security situation will worsen if Coalition troops leave the area (favorable defined as agreeing with statement)	0 (0)	9 (8)	91 (83)	4.4 ± 0.1
32. The Afghan people will benefit if the government disarms the militia forces	1 (1)	1 (1)	98 (89)	4.6 ± 0.1
33. The government's disarmament process will succeed	3 (3)	20 (18)	77 (70)	3.8 ± 0.1
34. If person is a victim of a crime, the police will help	0 (0)	52 (47)	48 (44)	3.0 ± 0.1
34.1. Crime is a problem in the area (question used only in Kandahar; favorable defined as disagreeing with statement answer)	0 (0)	76 (19)	24 (6)	2.2 ± 0.2

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Table 4. Human Rights

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
36. Person feels he could report a human rights abuse without fear of reprisal	2 (2)	50 (45)	48 (44)	2.3 ± 0.2
37. Are there human rights concerns in this area? (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	12 (11)	63 (57)	25 (23)	3.0 ± 0.1

Table 5. Democracy

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
38. CLJ delegates are representative of the people	5 (5)	41 (37)	54 (49)	3.4 ± 0.1
39. CLJ elections will be/were conducted impartially and without reprisals	8 (7)	42 (38)	50 46	3.2 ± 0.1
40. The CLJ process is legitimate	5 (5)	19 (17)	76 (65)	3.9 ± 0.1
41. National elections will be conducted fairly	12 (11)	43 (39)	45 (41)	3.3 ± 0.1
42. Person believes he can vote freely and without reprisal	0 (0)	19 (17)	81 (74)	3.9 ± 0.1

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Table 6. Government Meeting People's Needs

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
43. ITGA is doing something to contribute to relief efforts in area	4 (4)	37 (34)	58 (53)	3.4 ± 0.1
44. Government is addressing citizens' needs	4 (4)	57 (52)	38 (35)	2.8 ± 0.1
45. Person believes that he has adequate information about key aspects of government Activity	8 (7)	36 (33)	56 (51)	3.3 ± 0.1
46. Corruption is a serious problem in government (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	6 (5)	80 (73)	14 (13)	1.8 ± 0.1
47. People are free to say and write what they think about the government	0 (0)	46 (42)	54 (49)	3.2 ± 0.1
48. Person believes he will be treated fairly if arrested	0 (0)	67 (61)	33 (30)	2.6 ± 0.1
49. To get government services it helps to pay the government official a (bribe) personal fee (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	8 (7)	72 (66)	20 (18)	2.1 ± 0.1
50. Person is confident that his economic situation will improve	1 (1)	22 (20)	77 (70)	3.8 ± 0.1

Table 7. Leader Questions

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
54. Government has adequate offices, equipment and supplies	19 (5)	62 (16)	27 (7)	1.8 ± 0.2
55. Taxes are collected at this level of government (agreeing with statement defined as favorable)	12 (3)	50 (13)	38 (10)	2.6 ± 0.3
56. Taxes are submitted to higher government (agreeing with statement defined as favorable)	19 (5)	42 (11)	38 (10)	3.0 ± 0.4
57. To get government services for his village or office it helps to pay the higher level official a (bribe) personal fee (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	20 (5)	46 (12)	35 (9)	3.4 ± 0.4
58. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those willing to (bribe) pay (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	20 (5)	54 (14)	27 (7)	2.8 ± 0.3
59. Government employees are paid regularly	12 (3)	42 (11)	46 (12)	3.2 ± 0.3

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Table 8. Business Person Questions

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
64. It is easy to get information about government policies and procedures	24 (8)	41 (14)	35 (12)	3.0 ± 0.2
65. Laws, regulations, and fees are a problem for person's business (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	21 (7)	38 (13)	41 (14)	2.8 ± 0.2
66. Government protects property rights	17 (6)	50 (17)	32 (11)	2.7 ± 0.4
67. It is safe to use the banking system for financial assets	38 (13)	44 (15)	18 (6)	2.1 ± 0.3
68. To get government licenses or services for business it helps to make some (bribes) "unofficial payments" (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	18 (6)	59 (20)	18 (6)	2.3 ± 0.2
69. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those who make (bribes) "unofficial payments" (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	24 (8)	59 (20)	18 (6)	2.2 ± 0.2
70. Business is better this year than last year	15 (5)	9 (3)	76 (26)	4.0 ± 0.2

Table 8. Business Person Questions (Continued)

Statement (favorable defined where not obvious)	% Missing (Number)	% Not Favorable (Number)	% Favorable (Number)	Converted Response Score (Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean)
71. Person expects to be in business 3 years from now	15 (5)	9 (3)	76 (26)	4.1 ± 0.1
72. Person has hired or will hire employees this year	18 (6)	44 (15)	38 (13)	3.0 ± 0.2
73. The road infrastructure is a problem for the person's business (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	15 (5)	59 (20)	18 (6)	2.5 ± 0.3
74. Unofficial road use tolls are a problem for the person's business (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	24 (8)	38 (13)	38 (13)	3.0 ± 0.2
75. Local warlords are a problem for the person's business (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	15 (5)	38 (13)	47 (16)	3.1 ± 0.2
76. Crime is a problem for the person's business (disagreeing with statement defined as favorable)	18 (6)	35 (12)	47 (16)	3.0 ± 0.2

Table 9. Miscellaneous Questions.

Statement	Response
28. Person believes that civilian relief community and military are separate	Missing: 4% (4) Not Sure: 12% (11) Not Separate: 12% (11) Separate: 72% (65)
35. There is a police station within easy access by walking	Missing: 1% (1) No: 6% (6) Yes: 93% (86)
51. Education available and accessible	Missing: 1% (1) None: 0% (0) Informal only (homes/mosques): 0% (0) For boys only: 3% (3) For boys and girls: 96% (87)
60. Direction of government communications (last 30 days)	Missing: 0% (4) None: 15% (4) From higher only: 15% (4) To higher only: 15% (4) Two-way: 54% (14)
61. There is a central government (ITGA) representative present at this level of government	Missing: 42% (11) Does not know: 23% (6) No: 19% (5) Yes: 15% (4)

Table 10. Ranking of Needs for Gardez

Need	Frequency	Percent
Schools	18	19.4
Security	17	18.3
Roads	13	14.0
Medical facilities	11	11.8
Electricity	8	8.6
Jobs	5	5.4
Other infrastructure	5	5.4
Police	3	3.2
Teachers	3	3.2
Water (clean)	3	3.2
Other	3	3.2
Agricultural supplies	1	1.1
Equipment for government	1	1.1
Irrigation	1	1.1
Medical personnel	1	1.1
Food	0	0
Pay for government employees	0	0
Veterinary care	0	0
Total	93	100

Governance Assessments in Afghanistan

Table 11. Ranking of Needs for Jalalabad

Need	Frequency	Percent
Roads	17	16.4
Electricity	16	15.4
Schools	15	14.4
Jobs	12	11.5
Security	11	10.6
Medical facilities	9	8.6
Other	8	7.7
Water (clean)	6	5.8
Food	4	3.8
Other infrastructure	2	1.9
Police	2	1.9
Teachers	1	1.0
Pay for government employees	1	1.0
Agricultural supplies	0	0
Equipment for government	0	0
Irrigation	0	0
Medical personnel	0	0
Veterinary care	0	0
Total	104	100

Table 12. Ranking of Needs for Kandahar

| Need	Frequency	Percent
Security	19	25.3
Jobs	13	17.3
Electricity	11	14.7
Other	9	12.0
Schools	8	10.7
Roads	5	6.7
Medical facilities	3	4.0
Water (clean)	3	4.0
Police	2	2.7
Teachers	1	1.3
Agricultural supplies	1	1.3
Food	0	0
Other infrastructure	0	0
Pay for government employees	0	0
Equipment for government	0	0
Irrigation	0	0
Medical personnel	0	0
Veterinary care	0	0
Total	75	100

Governance Assessments in Afghanistan

Figure 1. Business Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Data collected in December, 2003.

Governance Assessments in Afghanistan

Figure 2. Corruption Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Bars with different letter labels indicate that mean indicator scores are statistically different (p<.05) between cities. Data collected in December, 2003.

Governance Assessments in Afghanistan

Figure 3. Democracy Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Bars with different letter labels indicate that mean indicator scores are statistically different (p<.05) between cities. Data collected in December, 2003.

Figure 4. Human Rights Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Data collected in December, 2003.

Governance Assessments in Afghanistan

Figure 5. Meeting Needs of the People Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Bars with different letter labels indicate that mean indicator scores are statistically different (p<.05) between cities. Data collected in December, 2003.

Figure 6. Police Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Bars with different letter labels indicate that mean indicator scores are statistically different (p<.05) between cities. Data collected in December, 2003.

Figure 7. Transparency Composite Governance Indicator Scores for Three Afghan Cities (mean ± standard error of the mean). No asterisk indicates that the mean indicator score is not statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A single asterisk "*" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Acceptable Governance Range. A double asterisk "**" indicates that the mean indicator score falls statistically below the Moderately Deficient Governance Range. Data collected in December, 2003.

Discussion

The following is a discussion of the performance of the AGQI methodology, general findings in terms of governance quality, and the impact of AGQI when incorporated into a governance mentoring program. Conclusions and recommendations are also presented.

Performance of the AGQI Methodology

Utility of the AGQI. The AGQI provides useful information for commanders and other interagency decision makers. It offers a significant advance beyond standard assessment tools used by civil affairs units. While other assessments emphasize infrastructure and related items, they do not assess the quality of governance. Traditionally, assessments of the type used here are conducted by non-military organizations that specialize in governance. However, such organizations cannot perform these assessments in locations where the security situation is nonpermissive. Under these conditions, assessments can be performed by civil affairs elements and the information shared with civilian organizations, when consistent with mission requirements. This was the case specifically for the assessment reported here for Kandahar. That assessment was performed at the request of UNAMA at a time when the security situation required the withdrawal of UN personnel from Kandahar. The results were subsequently shared with UNAMA.

From an operations standpoint, the assessments were executed very successfully, by teams that included American soldiers, Korean soldiers, and Afghan interpreters (Figures 8-9). This successful execution was made possible by three key factors: 1) systematic development of the AGQI with input and buy-in from a range of interagency stake-holders (including Coalition) and the involvement subject matter experts; 2) inclusion of a pilot phase during which early versions of the AGQI were tested and the methods validated in the field prior to executing the initial assessments; and 3) standardized training of assessment teams including interpreters and force protection personnel.

Although the AGQI is not difficult to complete, the importance of employing skilled and properly trained personnel to perform the AGQI deserves emphasis. The AGQI is not analogous to "person-on-the-street" opinion polls. Properly trained and locally operating personnel should perform the AGQI. These personnel understand the potential effects of their presence on responses and can take measures to minimize those effects. They are skilled at building relationships with the populace. They understand the implications of potential responses and can lead the conversation to get more information when warranted. These personnel understand the nuances of the local culture and the local situation. The use of properly trained and locally operating personnel also makes possible the high payoff that comes with building individual and organizational relationships over time.

Personnel who used the AGQI found that the AGQI was greatly superior to other assessment tools in terms of learning about the population and its needs. The Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) village assessment, as well as many other assessment formats used by US civil affairs units in the past, emphasizes

observation of things (infrastructure, crops, etc.). There is a further need for robust assessment tools for civil affairs and psychological operations personnel to assess the attitudes and needs of populations in a wide range of operations and environments. The AGQI meets this need and has great potential for use as a standard assessment method to augment Tactics Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) already in use by civil affairs and psychological operations forces.

Experienced civil affairs soldiers who were systematically interviewed about the utility of the AGQI process after the assessments indicated that the AGQI process was very useful for PRT operations, helped the teams learn more about the population, and was well worth the time required (Pusateri et al., 2004). At all PRTs where the AGQI process has been employed, including Bamian (pilot phase), Gardez, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Parwan (pilot phase), the general feeling was that the AGQI interview process, in addition to providing data for use in monitoring governance quality indicators, provided a discussion format that enhanced the understanding of the population. It was noted that with most other interactions with the populace, discussions were limited to a single topic, such as a well project, and did not include the in-depth discussions of the population's needs and attitudes that were facilitated by the AGQI.

Figure 8. Korean soldier leads the AGQI interview of a shop owner in Jalalabad.

Figure 9. AGQI interview team, including American soldiers and an Afghan interpreter, interview a local leader in Jalalabad

Validity of Data. Based on experience to date using the AGQI, we are confident in the validity of the data collected. Two important factors that determine the validity of the data are 1) statistical sampling plan and data analysis and 2) the accuracy of the responses obtained. Regarding the former, we are confident that proper methods were used in the development of AGQI and the related sampling strategy. These are discussed in detail in a separate report (Pusateri et al., 2004). We are also confident in the accuracy of the responses obtained, as described below.

In general, the Afghan interpreters with whom we performed these interviews expressed that the process was valuable and important, and that they were impressed with the level of honesty they perceived among the interviewees. Many interviewees stated that they were glad that someone was finally asking them what they thought. Interpreters at each location commented that they believed people were apt to be more honest and open with Coalition military personnel than with local government officials.

There were initial concerns about how interviewees might respond to seeing someone recording their responses and asking questions according to a form. Based on

experience with the assessments reported here, as well as our preliminary work at Bamian and Parwan (Pusateri et al., 2004), it does not appear that the obvious use of the AGQI data collection sheet in any way detracts from the quality of the interview. In fact, it appears that the obvious use of the form reinforces to the interviewee that the interviewer considers his or her opinions important.

The possibility must be considered that the mere presence of military personnel during the AGQI interview process might affect responses, rendering the data unreliable. The consistently positive attitude of the population toward coalition troops observed in the assessment results may indicate that the interviewees were saying what they thought interviewers wanted to hear. It is also possible that the responses are accurate. The fact that the majority of people interviewed thought that the security situation would worsen if the Coalition left at that time, may in part explain the positive attitude toward the coalition. Aside from the obvious question about attitude toward the Coalition, there are no other indications that responses were biased because of the military presence. While it is true that interview data may be affected by the military presence, the fact is that there is an effect of any assessor (person collecting data). There is an effect of a military presence, just as there would be an effect of civilian coalition government representatives or an effect of NGO personnel. There are also effects of subconscious assessor bias and many other factors. All data of this type are subject to assessor/interviewer effects. This does not mean that the data are not valid and useful; it means that these factors must be understood up-front. Each measurement has an unavoidable "human nature" component of variance associated with the interviewer. Recognizing this, we employed the following methods to account for and minimize these effects. These methods included: 1) use of skilled assessors; 2) use of a standardized, easy-to-use tool; 3) use of composite indicators; and 4) use of a systematic sampling plan. Additional planned measures to account for these potential effects include: 1) the use of multiple assessor-types and 2) accounting for assessor effects statistically (both within and between assessor-types). However, larger samples will be required for these methods. Based on currently available information, there is no reason to believe that AGQI data collected by military personnel are any less useful than interview data collected by anyone else.

Status of Governance
Good Governance. Governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance (UNESCAP, 2002). The term "good governance" has been increasingly used in the development literature to describe the governance qualities needed for successful society. Bad governance has been increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of evil within societies. Good governance has eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. In practice, good governance is an ideal that few countries have come close to in total (UNESCAP, 2002). Nonetheless, the concept of good

governance provides an important framework for development and for assessing progress toward development goals. In the process of defining the civil-military operations end state, it became clear to all, including our Coalition, UN, and other government agency partners in the process, that development of good governance (including a degree of progress and success in each area of governance) was critical for recognition of the legitimacy of the Afghan government, both within Afghanistan and internationally (Pusateri et al., 2004). Development of governance was also identified as a requirement before a large scale reduction in Coalition or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military presence could be accomplished without undue risk to stability.

Attitudes. The responses to the questions in the attitudes section of the assessment (Table 2) are important in that they suggest that the people were optimistic about the direction of the National Government, including the Afghan National Army. The support for local government and local police was somewhat lower, perhaps suggesting that either changes had not yet reached local levels or that the people were not as willing to give local leaders the benefit of the doubt as they were the National Government. The population was generally positive about the presence of the Coalition. It is impossible to state how much this response was influenced by the fact that Coalition soldiers conducted the interviews. Because the interview was completely voluntary, a degree of selection bias may have been encountered in that people who had a positive attitude toward the Coalition may have been more likely to participate. In practice, it was extremely rare for people to not agree to participate, suggesting that selection bias was not a major factor. Anecdotally, it was common for interviewees to state that they had a favorable view of the Coalition but then add that they also wanted the Coalition to go home when the Afghan government could handle the security situation.

The opinion score of only 3.3 for the civilian relief community was surprising. Two factors were commonly offered as explanation. First, it was felt that the relief community came and made big promises but then never returned. The other was that the people noticed the beautiful new vehicles driven by many of the relief organizations and commented that the world donated money to Afghanistan but the relief community put most of it in their own pockets. Considering the multitude of relief organizations present and the complex situation, it is impossible to determine what if any problem this may indicate. However, it was a perception stated by the people interviewed. A specific issue for the UNAMA representatives with whom we worked was that the population might confuse military personnel with NGOs and others. The concern was that such confusion could undermine the reputations of the NGOs as apolitical noncombatants. The AGQI results (question 28) suggest that this was not a problem, as 72% clearly understood the separation between the military and the civilian relief community.

Business. The business composite indicator scores fell within the acceptable or moderately deficient range. In general, responses indicated optimism but there were problems with regulatory burden, infrastructure (roads), and crime (extortion in the form of illegal tolls) that hindered business. As an example, the owner of a lumber yard in Jalalabad told us that well over half of his costs for goods were for tolls paid at illegal toll stops set up along the routes used by trucks bringing his lumber.

Corruption. Corruption is clearly a problem. The composite indicator scores for corruption were in the severely deficient range for each city. Responses suggest that bribery is the norm for individual citizens, low-level leaders, and business people if they are to have successful dealings with government.

Democracy. The democracy indicator was in the acceptable range for Gardez but both Jalalabad and Kandahar were statistically lower, in the moderately deficient range. The assessment was performed immediately prior to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ). At the time, voting was underway to elect delegates to the CLJ from each region. In general, people felt that the process was legitimate and that they could vote freely and without reprisal, although this was not universal. Anecdotally, many had a wait-and-see attitude but were optimistic. It will be extremely important to conduct follow-up assessments now that both the CLJ and the national elections have been successfully completed.

Human Rights. AGQI results suggest significant problems with human rights. The composite indicator scores were moderately deficient in Gardez and severely deficient in both Jalalabad and Kandahar. Over half of respondents did not think that they could safely report a human rights abuse and over 60% responded that there were human rights concerns in their area. This may be a residual fear from the years of the Taliban. We heard many stories of summary executions, confiscation of property, etc. under the Taliban. However, with the issues still present after nearly two years without the Taliban, it is likely that human rights abuses are not just a memory.

Meeting Needs of the People. The ability of the government to meet the needs of the people was in the moderately deficient range in each city. Although the majority of the people interviewed believed that the National Government was making an effort to improve security and deliver relief, the majority did not feel that the government was meeting the needs of the people in general.

Police. The police composite indicator addressed whether people could go to the police for help and whether police were effective in controlling crime. Both Gardez and Jalalabad were moderately deficient in this area, while Kandahar was severely deficient. The fact that Gardez scored statistically higher than either of the other two cities may reflect the aggressive police training program promoted through the PRT in Gardez and the Governor's removal of a corrupt police chief in the months before the assessment. However, this cannot be concluded for certain from the present data, and it is possible that other factors may account for this observation.

Transparency. Two of three cities had transparency composite scores in the moderately deficient governance range, while the third was borderline. This may be expected considering the very poor communications infrastructure, the low literacy rate, and the changing nature of government at the time of the assessment. As radios are made more available and, in the longer term, as literacy rises, information flow may improve. However, the higher level government will also need to expand its efforts in reaching local governments and the people with information. In the current assessment, less than

half of the low-level leaders who were asked stated that there was a representative of the national government located in their area (several did not know). As the National Government establishes closer ties with regional and local governments in the future, there is potential that information flow to the people will improve.

Needs. The very low ranking of food as a need confirms that the situation had progressed well beyond the relief phase by the time of the assessments, at least in these cities. Although there were differences among the cities in the precise rankings of needs, security, basic infrastructure, and jobs were the predominant needs in Jalalabad, Gardez, and Kandahar.

Impact of AGQI in a Governance Mentoring Program

In Paktia Province, civil affairs personnel from the Gardez PRT developed a mentoring relationship with the provincial governor and his staff over a period of several months prior to the governance assessment. In the course of the relationship, Governor Assadula Wafa was informed of and supported the governance assessments that were to be performed in Gardez. He was not told when or where the assessments would take place. It was agreed that he would receive summarized results of the assessments for use in helping him improve his government.

The release of the composite AGQI indicators to the governor and his staff had a direct impact on governmental operations in Paktia Province. Initially, the leaders were not sure what to do with the information. The first response of Governor Wafa was one of denial. He stated that there were no human rights or corruption issues in his province. However, upon further discussion of survey results in a collaborative environment, the governor realized that it was likely that the problems were occurring, yet were not being reported. This realization lead to meetings of senior department heads where ethical Muslim standards of conduct were reinforced. Additionally, information campaigns were launched requesting that citizens report any governmental corruption and human rights abuses directly to the governor's office.

As a further measure, Governor Wafa also committed to publishing governmental performance data and other information in local newspapers and radio stations in an attempt to show the improvement of government services. It was the hope of the governmental leaders that by informing the public of their plans for the future and the challenges faced, and by openly reporting both their successes and failures, the government would earn the public's trust. Follow-up is necessary to determine the effects of any government changes that were made.

Conclusions

We have demonstrated the feasibility and utility of conducting governance quality assessments in a hostile environment. The AGQI enables the systematic assessment and monitoring of governance at the local and regional levels. The combined qualitative and quantitative nature of the information gathered makes it both immediately useable by civil affairs teams and PRT commanders (or other leaders), and also useful when consolidated at higher levels of command, or when shared with interagency partners and nongovernmental civilian relief organizations.

The AGQI can be employed as a valuable component of a system of measures of effectiveness for civil-military or related operations (Pusateri et al., 2004). In this regard, the systematic use of the AGQI may contribute to larger programs designed to provide metrics to assess progress toward measurable objectives. Reliable metrics are important for governance and reconstruction programs (GAO, 2004) as well as for the Global War on Terror in general (Rumsfeld, 2003).

The governance problems observed in the areas of corruption, police, and others appear to support the initial concerns that, at the local levels outside of Kabul, corruption or "warlordism" would rapidly fill the vacuum left after the fall of the Taliban. It cannot be determined by a single sample whether these are problems that are relatively new and growing worse or problems that are improving from a previously poor status. Initial efforts at providing governance development support were hindered by the security situation as well as by manpower and financial constraints. At the time of the assessments reported here (December 2003), the security situation and other factors severely limited the ability of the civilian aid community to reach many areas (GAO, 2004). The PRTs offered the only means to perform governance assessments in many areas, especially where the security situation was nonpermissive. The analysis presented represents an initial one. More comprehensive analysis will be possible when follow-up assessments are conducted. It is possible that during the intervening months, with the successful Constitutional Loya Jirga, national elections, and increased activity of governance promotion programs, the problems with police and corruption will have improved. It is extremely important to conduct follow-up AGQI to determine whether this is the case.

The initial success in applying the AGQI in the context of a collaborative relationship with the Paktia Governor demonstrates that the AGQI can be useful not just for monitoring progress but also in helping tailor local and regional governance development programs by providing a mechanism for feedback over time.

Whether employed according to a national strategy or used in a targeted manner, data from AGQI provides useful information for decision making at the PRT and higher levels, for guiding good governance mentorship programs, and for monitoring progress over time in a statistically valid manner. The AGQI is a tool that empowers civil affairs and tactical psychological operations teams and their commanders to better understand the population and its needs. It also has non-military applications. Although the AGQI

was specifically designed for use in Afghanistan, it will be useful for CMO as well as non-military operations in other parts of the world, with slight modification.

Recommendations for AGQI

The following recommendations are made pertaining to the AGQI:

1. Conduct follow-up assessments in Gardez, Jalalabad, and Kandahar and expand the use of the AGQI to other parts of Afghanistan.

2. Develop strategies to employ the AGQI to assess progress/changes: 1) associated with important development milestones, such as key elections; 2) resulting from significant governance promotion and reconstruction programs; and 3) following significant military operations.

3. Employ AGQI as a routine method for improving PRT and other commanders' understandings of the local population and its needs. Ensure information sharing as units rotate.

4. Incorporate the AGQI as an important component of a larger system of Measures of Effectiveness for operations in Afghanistan.

5. Assess the feasibility of employing the AGQI method in operations outside of Afghanistan.

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Appendix A. Assessment of Governance Quality Indicators Data Collection Sheet

1. Date:	2. Recorder:	3. CAT-A:

4. PRT: ☐ Bamian(1) ☐ Gardez(2) ☐ Ghazni(3) ☐ Herat(4) ☐ Jalalabad(5)
☐ Kandahar(6) ☐ Konduz(7) ☐ MeS(8) ☐ Parwan(9)

☐ Other(10):_____

5. Village:	6. Village Location (grid (*preferred*) or Lat-Long):
7. District:	8. Province:

9. Population (list family information or total population):

a. Number Families:_____ **b. Family Size:**_____ **c. Total Population:**_____

10. Ethnic Group of Person Interviewed:
☐ Aimak(1) ☐ Baloch(2) ☐ Brahui(3) ☐ Hazara(4) ☐ Kirghiz(5) ☐ Kuchie(6)
☐ Nuristani(7) ☐ Pashtun(8) ☐ Qizilibash(9) ☐ Tajik(10) ☐ Turkman(11) ☐ Uzbeck(12)

☐ Other(13):_____

11. Gender of person interviewed: ☐ Male(1)   ☐ Female(2)

12. Is person interviewed a business owner/management representative?:
☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)

13. Is person interviewed a member of the media?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)

14. Is person interviewed employed by the government?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)

15. Is person interviewed a leader/leader's representative?: ☐ No(1) ☐ Yes(2)
(Includes elected and appointed delegate/representative of the people)

Government Employee Only (i.e. answered #14 Yes)

16. Occupation in Service of Government: ☐ Education(1)
☐ Elected/appointed delegate/representative of the people(2) ☐ Health Care(3)
☐ Individual Contract Service(4) ☐ Judicial (Court System)(5) ☐ Military(6) ☐ Police(7)
☐ Revenue (accepts money (e.g. taxes, fees, etc.) on behalf of government)(8)
☐ Other civil service(9)

Leader/Leader Representative Only (i.e. answered #15 Yes)

17. Level of Leadership Position: ☐ Local/Village/City(1) ☐ District(2) ☐ Province(3)
☐ National(4) ☐ Military(5)

18. Type of Leader: ☐Civil(1) ☐ Education(2)
☐ Elected/appointed delegate/representative of the people(3) ☐ Judicial (Court System)(4)
☐ Military ANA(5) ☐ Military Not ANA(6) ☐ Ministerial Representative(7) ☐ Police(8)
☐ Religious(9) ☐ Traditional(10)

☐ Other(11): _____

19. Position of Leader (Mark all that apply): ☐ District (Sub)governor(1) ☐ Judge(2)
☐ Mayor(3)   ☐ Military Commander(4) ☐ Mullah(5) ☐Police Chief/Commander(6)
☐ School Principal(7) ☐ Shura Leader(8) ☐ Village Elder(9)

☐ Other(10):_____

20. Name of Leader/Leader Representative (Optional):

Attitudes

Rate the person's attitude toward the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Strongly Positive
21. ITGA (Central Government)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
22. ANA (Afghan National Army)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
23. Local Government (for leader read as "next higher government")	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
24. Local Police	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
25. Presence of Coalition Troops	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
26. Relief Community	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
27. Other ethnic groups in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

---Format Change---

28. Person believes that   Does not know (0) ☐   No (1) ☐   Yes (5) ☐
civilian relief community
and military are separate

Security

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
29. ITGA is responsible for security efforts in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
30. The security situation is good; there are no security concerns	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
31. The security situation will worsen if Coalition troops leave the area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
32. The Afghan people will benefit if the government disarms the militia forces	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
33. The government's disarmament process will succeed	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
34. If person is a victim of a crime, the police will help	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

---Format Change---

35. There is a police station within a half day's travel (by normal means)   Does not know (0) ☐   No (1) ☐ Yes (5) ☐

Human Rights

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
36. Person feels he could file a human rights complaint without fear of reprisal	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

---Format Change---

37. Are there human rights concerns   Does not know (0) ☐   No (1) ☐   Yes (5) ☐
(government mistreats populace) in this area?

Democracy

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
38. CLJ delegates are representative of the people	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
39. CLJ elections will be conducted impartially and without reprisals	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
40. The CLJ process is legitimate	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
41. National election authority will be impartial	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
42. Person believes he can vote freely and without reprisal	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs

	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
43. ITGA is responsible for relief efforts in area	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
44. Government is addressing citizens' needs	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
45. Person believes that he has adequate information about key aspects of government activity	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
46. Corruption is a serious problem in government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
47. People are free to say and write what they think about the government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
48. Person believes he will be treated fairly if arrested or if he files a complaint with the police	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Government Competency in Meeting People's Needs (Continued)

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
49. To get government services it helps to pay the government official a personal fee (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
50. Person is confident that his economic situation will improve (including food and shelter if applicable)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

---Format Change---

51. Education available and accessible   (0) ☐ None   (1) ☐ Informal only (homes/mosques)

(2) ☐ For boys only   (3) ☐ For boys and girls

Top Three Needs

52. Top 3 needs as stated by the person:	**53. Top 3 needs as judged by the recorder:**
1 ☐ Agricultural supplies	1 ☐ Agricultural supplies
2 ☐ Electricity	2 ☐ Electricity
3 ☐ Employment opportunities	3 ☐ Employment opportunities
4 ☐ Equipment/facilities for government	4 ☐ Equipment/facilities for government
5 ☐ Food	5 ☐ Food
6 ☐ Infrastructure repairs not addressed in other categories	6 ☐ Infrastructure repairs not addressed in other categories
7 ☐ Irrigation	7 ☐ Irrigation
8 ☐ Medical facilities	8 ☐ Medical facilities
9 ☐ Medical personnel	9 ☐ Medical personnel
10 ☐ Pay for government employees	10 ☐ Pay for government employees
11 ☐ Police	11 ☐ Police
12 ☐ Road/bridge	12 ☐ Road/bridge
13 ☐ Schools	13 ☐ Schools
14 ☐ Security presence	14 ☐ Security presence
15 ☐ Teachers	15 ☐ Teachers
16 ☐ Veterinary care	16 ☐ Veterinary care
17 ☐ Water (clean water to drink)	17 ☐ Water (clean water to drink)
18 ☐ Other:	18 ☐ Other:

If person is a leader, go to question 54.
If person is a business person, go to question 62.

Leader Only

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
54. Government has adequate offices, equipment and supplies (refers to the person's level of government)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
55. Taxes are collected at this level of government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
56. Taxes are submitted to higher government	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
57. To get government services for his village or office it helps to pay the higher level official a personal fee (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
58. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those willing to pay (bribe)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
59. Government employees are paid regularly	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

---Format Change---

60. Direction of government communications (last 30 days)

(0) ☐ None   (1) ☐ From higher only

(2) ☐ To higher only   (3) ☐ Two-way

61. There is a central government (ITGA) representative present at this level of government

Does not know (0) ☐   No (1) ☐   Yes (5) ☐

Business Owner or Management Representative Only

62. Number of employees:_____	

63. Type of business:

☐ Agriculture(1)   ☐ Banking/Finance(2)   ☐ Commerce (retail or wholesale)(3)
☐ Construction(4) ☐ Food processing(5) ☐ Manufacturing(6) ☐ Mining/Natural Resources(7)
☐ Professional (e.g. physician, lawyer, etc.)(8)   ☐ Service(9)
☐ Transportation, distribution, storage (e.g. trucking, etc.)(10)

☐ Other(11):_____

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
64. It is easy to get information about government policies and procedures	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
65. Laws, regulations, and fees are a problem for person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
66. Government protects property rights	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
67. It is safe to use the banking system for financial assets	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
68. To get government licenses or services for business it helps to make some "unofficial payments" (bribes)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
69. Some higher level officials will enact regulations that favor those who make "unofficial payments" (bribes)	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
70. Business is better this year than last year	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
71. Person expects to be in business 3 years from now	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Business Owner or Management Representative Only (Continued)

Categorize the person's level of agreement (actual or estimated) with the following:	N/A or Knows Nothing About	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
72. Person has hired or will hire employees this year	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
73. The road infrastructure is a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
74. Unofficial road use tolls are a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
75. Local warlords are a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
76. Crime is a problem for the person's business	0 ☐	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Comments